In This Story
A new book released this month by the Washington, D.C.-based Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) takes on disincentivizing biological weapons development. The book, “Disincentivizing Bioweapons: Theory and Policy Approaches,” includes a substantial chapter written by Schar School of Policy and Government associate professor Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley. The book was launched on December 11 during the United Nations’s Biological Weapons Convention Meeting of Experts in Geneva, with the professor in attendance. Here is a brief recap of her chapter, “Two Competing Bioweapons Nonproliferation Policies: Deterrence by Denial and Dissuasion.”
Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley, an associate professor in the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University, questions the idea of “biodeterrence by denial,” a concept that rests on the idea that developing good defenses against bioweapons would suffice to deter international actors from using these weapons. She notes that the conditions for deterrence by denial are not currently present, in part because bioweapons defense is still generally very weak. Combining weak defense with a primary policy of deterrence by denial may have the opposite of the intended effect, incentivizing states and terror groups to go after these weapons. Ben Ouagrham-Gormley instead proposes more focus on the adverse cost-to-benefit of trying to obtain these weapons.
“Over the past few years, analysts have promoted the idea that a policy of deterrence by denial could help deter bioweapons use because building strong defenses against bioweapons will convince potential users of their futility,” she writes.
“This essay offers an alternative policy of bioweapons dissuasion, which aims to exploit the current challenges of bioweapons development to convince would-be proliferators that the cost–benefit ratio is not in favor of bioweapons development. The essay also evaluates the extent to which new technologies such as artificial intelligence can or cannot support bioweapons development.”
She continued: “The alternative to biodeterrence by denial that I have been promoting for over a decade is a policy of biodissuasion. Biodissuasion rests on the principle that the barriers to entry to bioweapons are much greater than the proponents of deterrence by denial make it out to be and, therefore, reinforcing these barriers to entry would yield greater benefits at a much lower cost.
“This policy is not without challenges because it requires systematic and coordinated action from the whole of government. But it carries the potential of reinforcing the biological weapons nonproliferation regime and norms against bioweapons development and use."